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Evolution of Pakistan Eastern Command plan
The Eastern Military High Command of the Pakistan Armed Forces was a field-level military command headed by an appointed senior 3-star officer, who was designated the Unified Commander of the Eastern Military High Command. After the partition of India by Great Britain, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was divided into two territories separated by (prior to the independence of Bangladesh in 1971). Most of the Pakistan armed forces were stationed in West Pakistan; the role of the Pakistan armed forces in East Pakistan was to hold out until Pakistan defeated India in the west (in case of war).〔Niazi, Lt. Gen. A.A.K, The Betrayal of East Pakistan, pp128〕 The Pakistan armed forces created the Eastern Military High Command, with one unified commander of the Pakistan armed forces responsible for the command. The armed forces (particularly the Pakistan Army), had drawn up a plan to defend Dhaka by concentrating all their forces along the Dhaka Bowl (the area surrounded by the rivers Jamuna, Padma and Meghna).〔Ali, Maj. Gen. Rao Farman, How Pakistan Got Divided, pp118 – pp119〕 After Pakistan launched Operation Searchlight and Operation Barisal to curb the Awami League-led political movement in March 1971 (leading to the creation of Mukti Bahini and insurgency throughout Bangladesh), General Niazi (last unified commander of the Eastern Military High Command) revised the existing plan according to the Pakistan's premier General Headquarters (GHQ) directive (which emphasized the need to prevent the Mukti Bahini from occupying any area of the province and to fight for every inch of territory).〔Niazi, Lt. Gen. A.A.K, The Betrayal of East Pakistan, pp131- pp132〕〔Hassan Khan, Lt. Gen. Gul, Memories of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, pp301, pp307〕 HQ expected the Indians to occupy a large area of the province, transfer the Mukti Bahini and Bengali refugees there and recognize the Bangladesh government in exile – turning the insurgency into an international diplomatic issue.〔Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, pp123〕 General Niazi (and his deputy unified commander, Vice-Admiral Mohammad Shariff) designated 10 cities (Jessore, Jhenaidah, Bogra, Rangpur, Jamalpur, Mymensingh, Sylhet, Comilla and Chittagong) on major communication hubs as "fortress towns" and placed the bulk of his troops near the Indian border.〔Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, pp124 -125〕〔Jacob, Lt. Gen. JFR, Surrender at Dacca, pp73〕 The final plan called for the armed forces to delay Indian attacks at the border and then gradually fall back to the fortress towns.〔Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, pp124 -125〕 From the fortresses, part of the surviving force was to take up positions near Dhaka and hold out until India was defeated in the west; Pakistani forces in the fortress towns would delay the bulk of the Indian forces and prevent them from concentrating on Dhaka.
==Background==
The Pakistan Army inherited six infantry divisions and an armored brigade after independence in 1947 from the British Indian Army,〔Major Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp47〕 deploying most of their armed assets in West Pakistan. East Pakistan had one infantry brigade in 1948, which was made up of two infantry battalions, the 1st East Bengal Regiment and the 1/14 or 3/8 Punjab Regiment. Between them, the two battalions boasted five rifle companies (a battalion normally had five companies).〔Major Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp49〕 This weak brigade – under the command of Brigadier Ayub Khan (local rank Major General – GOC 14 Division) – and a number of East Pakistan Rifles wings were tasked with defending East Pakistan during the Kashmir War of 1947.〔Major Nasir Uddin, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, pp47, pp51〕 The Pakistan Air Force and Navy had little presence in East Pakistan at that time. The reasons for placing more than 90 percent of the armed might in West Pakistan were:
*West Pakistan borders Kashmir (an issue the Pakistani government was not above using armed force to resolve): Pakistan did not have the economic base to support adequate forces in both wings, and West Pakistan had more strategic depth that East Pakistan.〔Ali, Maj. Gen. Rao Farman, How Pakistan Got Divided, pp114〕
*Most government officials were from West Pakistan or non-Bengali. Most economic development was taking place in West Pakistan, and the bulk of the armed forces was placed to keep its power base secure. Pakistani military staff planners proposed the following doctrine to justify this deployment: "The defense of the East lies in the West".〔Niazi, Lt. Gen. A.A.K, The Betrayal of East Pakistan, pp1q2〕 Broadly speaking, this translated into Pakistan defeating India in the west, regardless of what transpired in the east (including Indian occupation of East Pakistan)〔Ali, Maj. Gen. Rao Farman, How Pakistan Got Divided, pp114〕 because the presumed West Pakistani success would force India to negotiate a favorable settlement.〔Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, pp309 – pp310〕 The Pakistani staff also believed in the martial race theory; it was widely believed that one Pakistani soldier was equal to four to ten Hindus/Indian soldiers,〔^ Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat Richard H. Shultz, Andrea Dew: "The Martial Races Theory had firm adherents in Pakistan and this factor played a major role in the under-estimation of the Indian Army by Pakistani soldiers as well as civilian decision makers in 1965."^〕〔^ Library of Congress studies.〕 and the numerical superiority of the Indian armed forces ccould be negated by its smaller number of Pakistani soldiers.〔^ a b The Idea of Pakistan By Stephen P. Cohen Published by Brookings Institution Press, 2004 ISBN 0-8157-1502-1 pp 103-104.〕
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